Private Ballots, Public Tallies: What Changes When Voting Moves to a Privacy-Preserving Blockchain
How HappyVote on Aztec approaches ballot privacy, one-person-one-vote, public verification, and the trust assumptions behind remote electronic voting.
The problem is not just “put voting on a blockchain”
Electronic voting has a difficult set of requirements that pull in opposite directions.
A voting system needs to establish that only eligible participants can vote and that nobody can vote twice. At the same time, it must prevent anyone from learning how a particular person voted. The tally must be verifiable, while a voter should not receive a receipt that can be shown to an employer, government official, teacher, or anyone else as proof of their choice.
And there is another question that is easy to miss:
Who has to be trusted for the system to produce the result it claims to produce?
This article looks at that question through two very different architectures.
In September 2020, Rostelecom published an overview on ...
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