Copilot, LiteLLM and the AI trust boundary gap

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Two AI tools broke in the same way in the same two weeks, and four research teams proved it. The pattern underneath every disclosure is one sentence: enterprise AI accepts external input with no trust boundary.

On June 15, Varonis disclosed SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824), a proof-of-concept exfiltration chain in Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise Search. A victim clicks a crafted microsoft.com URL, Copilot searches their mailbox, and the data leaves through a Bing SSRF. No plugins, no second click, no visible indicator. Four days earlier, Obsidian Security published a three-CVE chain against LiteLLM that carried a default low-privilege user all the way to admin and remote code execution. Two tools. Two teams. One broken boundary.

The five-check audit at the end of this article maps each gap to a CVE or a market signal from June, a command you can run before lunch, and a sentence a CISO can read to...

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